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Aquinas on the essential composition 
of objects 
I. In this paper a formal language will be constructed in which an 
essential part of Aquinatic ontology can be precisely formulated. In the 
formal language an axiomatization of this part of Aquinatic ontology 
will be given, and its exegetic adequacy shown by deducing a long series 
of theorems that are all in accordance with the ontological teachings of 
Aquinas. It will be made plausible that no theorem contradicting Aqui-
natic ontology can be derived. Finally the consistency of the axiom-
system will be demonstrated by providing a model for it. The texts 
referred to are the Summa theologiae, Summa contra gentiles and De ente et 
essentia. 
II. Before beginning a remark concerning method is in order. This 
paper has been written in the conviction that the logical reconstruction 
of philosophical doctrines can be of value for our understanding of them 
(if they can be at all subjected to such treatment). This conviction is not 
uncontroversial. It is in the nature of a logical reconstruction that it 
contains certain deviations from the original. In a logical reconstruction 
inconsistencies are avoided, that is, inessential inconsistencies due to 
carelessness; for essentially inconsistent theories are not amenable to 
logical reconstruction. (Sometimes, however, an attempt at logical 
reconstruction is necessary in order to show that a philosophical theory 
is essentially inconsistent.) In a logical reconstruction instances of 
ambiguity and vagueness are unravelled into alternative non-ambig-
uous and non-vague logical sub-reconstructions. The theoretical hori-
zon of a logical reconstruction is normally wider than that of the ori-
ginal; it normally points out conclusions that the author of the original 
did not think of or at least did not mention; these 'new insights', 
however, must not be contrary to the spirit of the original; else, the 
logical reconstruction is inadequate. A logical reconstruction employs 
logical resources of which the author had no or only an inadequate idea. 
A logical reconstruction demonstrates conclusions that the author of the 
original merely stated on the strength of his intuitions or arrived at by 
entirely inconclusive arguments. A logical reconstruction is more, 
sometimes much more systematic than the original, connecting results 
that are not connected in the latter; but it may also disconnect results 
that are connected in the original, if no justifiable logical bond can be 
found between them. 
If the original is open to logical reconstruction, then the mentioned 
deviations of its logical reconstruction from it, if they remain within 
limits, will not contribute to its distortion but rather to its clarification, 
revealing, as it were, what the author would have said if he had had the 
modern logical techniques at his disposal. 
III. The present logical reconstruction refers to the ontological doc-
trines of Aquinas concerning the composition (compositio) of (existent) 
objects (res per se subsistentes, substantiae primae) by their essential 
aspects. Aquinas knows five essential aspects of an object: its matter; its 
pure substantial formy its being, its essence, and its actuating substantialform. 
Accordingly five functional terms are introduced: m(0), f(0), s(0), w(0), 
a(0), where 0 can be replaced by any object-variable or object-name. 
They are to be read as 'the matter of 0', 'the pure form of 0' (short for 'the 
pure substantial form of 0'), 'the being of 0\ 'the essence of 0', 'the 
actuating form of 0' (short for 'the actuating substantial form of 0'). 
Normally object-aspects are not objects (there are, however, excep-
tions); thus it is not generally meaningful to speak, for example, of the 
essence of the being of an object, or of the being of the being of an object. 
The formal language will consequently be constructed in such a manner 
that iterated functional terms like w(f(0)), s(w(f(0))), f(s(m(0))) etc. are 
not well-formed. To allow such functional-terms to be well-formed is 
warranted by nothing in the writings of Aquinas. 
Certain objects according to Aquinas have no matter; for such 
objects the function the matter of is initially not defined. However, a 
complete definition (that is, a definition for all objects) is secured for this 
function by assuming an empty aspect of every object, and by stipulating 
that if an object has no matter its matter is its empty aspect. Corre-
spondingly, the functional term c(0) is introduced, which is to be read as 
'the empty aspect of 0'. 
Aspects of the same object, according to Aquinas, combine to form 
an aspect of the object or the object itself, and Aquinas, as has been 
said, knows five aspects of an object. In correspondence to this we 
have a dyadic functional term + such that only functional expres-
sions with + of the forms (ß(0) + ß'(0)), ((ß(0) + ß'(0)) + ß"(0)), 
(ß"(0)+(ß(0) + ß'(0))) are well-formed, where ß, ß\ ß" may each be 
replaced by m, f, s, and c. Why not also by w and a? Because we are here 
referring to the language without defined expressions, and with the help 
of the compositional functor w and a can be defined in keeping with the 
writings of Aquinas. The first definition is: 
(i) w(0): = (f(0) + m(0)) - the essence of an object is its pure form 
combined with its matter. 
According to Aquinas this definition is not adequate for all objects; 
it is only adequate for material objects. But the introduction of c(0) 
makes it possible for us to regard it as the general definition of essence. 
Let 'g' designate some immaterial object; then w(g) = (f(g) + m(g)) is 
equivalent to w(g) = f(g), which corresponds to the Aquinatic definition 
of essence for immaterial objects: the essence of an immaterial object is 
its pure form. Since g is immaterial we have m(g) = c(g), hence 
(f(g) + m(g)) = (f(g) + c(g)), hence (f(g) + m(g)) = f(g) - the empty aspect 
of g adds nothing to the pure form of g. Aquinas says: 
1. In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae <sive materialis) et sub-
stantiae simplicis <sive immaterialis>, quod essentia substantiae compositae 
non est tantum forma sed complectitur formam et materiam, essentia autem 
substantiae simplicis est forma tantum. 
(De ente et essentia, 4, 25) <Divi Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Phiiosopbica, 
cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi, M. Spiazzi O. P., iMarietti, Roma 1954>. 
While Aquinas speaking of composition always means proper com-
position, that is, the composition of different, non-empty aspects (of the 
same object), we also have improper composition, that is, the composition 
of an aspect with itself or with the empty aspect (of the same object). (By 
being different, object-aspects - at least the essential object-aspects 
considered by Aquinas - are distinct, since they cannot be proper parts 
of each other or overlap). 
The second definition is: 
(ii) a(0): = (f(0) + s(0)) - the actuating form of an object is its pure form 
combined with its being; or: the actuating form of an object is the 
composition of its pure form and its being. 
Aquinas does not verbally distinguish between the actuating form of 
an object and its pure form, and on the whole he seems to be unaware of 
their being distinct (in most objects). However, his doctrines can only be 
consistently interpreted by considering the pure form of an object to be 
normally distinct from its actuating form. In the following quotations 
Aquinas is referring to the actuating form of an object: 
2. ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale quando componuntur 
(De ente et essentia, 6, 34). 
3. per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc 
aliquid 
(De ente et essentia, 2, 6). 
And Aquinas adds: 
4. unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse 
actu tale ... Unde, quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari sim-
pliciter, sed secundum quid. 
(De ente et essentia, 2, 6). 
In the quotation below, however, Aquinas is referring to the pure form 
of an object: 
5. esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae neque tantum materiae, 
sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. 
Unde oportet ut essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma, nec 
tantum materia, sed utrumque, quam vis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma 
sit causa. 
(De ente et essentia, 2, 6bis). 
Here Aquinas names a third ultimate distinct component in the com-
position of a material substance beside form and matter: its being (esse); 
while in the previous quotations he only mentions form and matter, 
obviously intending that they by themselves suffice to constitute the 
object. This apparent discrepancy can be resolved by supposing that in 
the last quotation Aquinas means by 'forma' the pure form of the object 
which together with the matter of the object composes its essence, which 
in its turn enters into composition with the being of the object to 
constitute the object itself; while in the previous quotations he means by 
'forma' the pure form of the object in composition with its being, that is, the 
actuating form of the object, which together with the matter of the object 
composes the object itself. It amounts to the same, whether pure form 
and matter are first composed to constitute essence, and then essence 
and being to constitute the object; or whether pure form and being are 
first composed to constitute actuating form, and then actuating form 
and matter to constitute the object. 
In the next quotation the first instance of the word 'forma' means 
the actuating form of the object, the second instance, however, its pure 
form: 
6. In substantiis autem compositis ex materia et forma est duplex compositio 
actus et potentiae: prima quidem ipsius substantiae, quae componitur ex 
materia et forma; secunda vero, ex ipsa substantia iam composita et esse; 
quae etiam potest dici ex quod est et esse, vel ex quod est et quo est. 
(Summa contra gentiles, 2, 54). 
In this passage we also have an example of the equivocal use of the word 
'substantia' in the writings of Aquinas; the first instance of this word 
signifies the same as 'res' ('object', 'first substance'), the second and 
third, however, the same as 'essentia seu natura' ('essence', 'second 
substance'). Aquinas is aware of this equivocation; in Summa theologiae, 
1,29,2 - following Aristotle - he explicitly distinguishes the two mean-
ings of 'substantia': 
7. substantia dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam 
significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat substan-
tiam rei: quam quidem substantiam Graeci usiam vocant, quod nos essentiam 
dicere possumus. - Alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum velsuppositum quod 
subsistit in genere substantiae. 
In contrast, Aquinas seems not to be aware of the equivocation in his use 
of the word 'forma'; he apparently does not differentiate between what 
we have here been calling 'pure form' and what we have here been 
calling 'actuating form'. The identification of what on the strength of his 
own theory is non-identical is bound to lead to some confusion, as we 
shall see. (The use of 'forma' to refer to the actuating form of an object is, 
it seems, predominant over the use of'forma' to refer to the pure form of 
an object.) 
The matter of a material object cannot enter into composition with 
the being of that object (while the pure form of any object enters into 
composition with its being to constitute its actuating form); there is no 
'actuating matter' of a material object; matter is actuated by the actuat-
ing form (compare quotations 2 and 3); the complementary view of pure 
form being actuated by the actuating matter is absurd for Aquinas; not 
matter but pure form is the 'vehicle' of being: 
8. forma tarnen potest dici quo est, secundum quod est essendi principium 
(Summa contra gentiles, 2,54). 
9. quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa 
(the last phrase of quotation 6). 
10. materia vero non habet esse nisi per formam 
(De ente et essentia, 6,36). 
In consequence the composition-function is initially not defined if the 
arguments are the matter of a material object and the being of that 
object. We can, however, stipulate that for any material object the 
composition of its matter with its being is its empty aspect. 
IV. It has become apparent that the possibilities of expression by means 
of the compositional-functor + are drastically limited in the intended 
formal language. To sum up: 
(a) A well-formed compositional expression contains at most two 
instances of +. 
(b) Only expressions having the form f(0), m(0), s(0), c(0) may occur 
in a well-formed compositional expression (without defined 
expressions) as argument expressions that are not themselves 
compositional expressions. 
(c) Exactly one object-variable or exactly one object-name occurs in a 
well-formed compositional expression. 
These restrictions can be justified as follows: 
(a') Aquinas does not consider more complex compositions than can 
be expressed by the compositional expressions allowed to be well-
formed. 
(b') Aquinas does not in general consider the composition of an object 
with an object or with an object-aspect; he only considers the 
composition of an object-aspect with an object-aspect (occasion-
ally, however, an object-aspect is identical with an object). 
(c') Aquinas does not in general consider the composition of aspects 
of different objects; he only considers the composition of aspects 
of the same object (occasionally, however, an aspect of one object 
is identical with an aspect of another object). 
In spite of the restrictions there still can be generated infinitely many 
well-formed compositional expressions; but for each object-designator 
(object-variable or object-name) the number of well-formed composi-
tional expressions 'around' it is finite. 
The axiom-system will be constructed in such a manner that all 
well-formed compositional expressions around the object-designator 0 
are reducible to 0, c(0), m(0), f(0), s(0), w(0) (= (f(0) + m(0))) and a(0) 
(= (f(0) + s(0)). As has been said, Aquinas knows only five aspects of an 
object; in addition to these we have for reasons of formal simplification 
the empty aspect of an object; and by composition of the aspects of an 
object there issues an aspect of this object or the object itself. In special 
cases the reduction of compositional expressions can be carried further 
than this. For example, if 0 designates an immaterial object, we have 
m(0) = c(0) and w(0) = f(0). 
Which predicates should belong to our formal language? As basic 
predicate only the identity-predicate = . With respect to the sentences 
and open sentences generable with the help of = no further restrictions 
are made; such - as, for example, requiring that one and the same object 
designator has to occur left and right of = - would not be justified by 
the writings of Aquinas. As will become apparent a great many other 
predicates for Aquinatic ontological distinctions can be defined with the 
help of the identity-predicate, the aspect-expressions and the logical 
expressions. The rendering of 'est' by 'is identical with' in the present 
context of a treatment of the composition of objects by their aspects is, of 
course, a matter of interpretation; this rendering can be said to be 
overwhelmingly suggested by the relevant passages in the writings of 
Aquinas. 
V . The reflections in sections III. and IV. are summed up and made 
precise by the following definition of the formal language T : 
7. Object-variables (OVs) of T 
(a) V is an O V of T ; 
(b) if 0 is an O V of T , then 0' is an O V of T ; 
(c) OVs of T are only expressions satisfying (a) and (b). 
2. Object-names (ONs) of T 
(a) 'g' is an O N of T ; 
(b) if 0 is an O N of T , then 0' is an O N of T ; 
(c) ONs of T are only expressions satisfying (a) and (b). 
3. Object-designators (ODs) of T 
0 is an O D of T = D f 0 is an O V of T , or 0 is an O N of T 
4. Primary aspect-expressions (PAEs) of T 
(a) If 0 is an O D of T , then m(0), f(0), s(0) and c(0) are PAEs of T ; 
(b) PAEs of T are only expressions satisfying (a). 
5. Secondary aspect-expressions (SAEs) of T 
(a) If 0 is an O D of T and ß(0) and ß'(0) are PAEs of T , then 
(ß(0) + ß'(0)) i s a S A E o f T ; 
(b) SAEs of T are only expressions satisfying (a). 
6. Aspect-expressions (AEs) of T 
(a) PAEs and SAEs of T , are AEs of T ; 
(b) if 0 is an O D of T and ß(0) is a P A E of T and (ß'(0) + ß"(0)) is a S A E 
of T , then (ß(0)+ (ß'(0) + ß"(0))) and ((ß'(0) + ß"(0)) + ß(0)) are AEs of 
T ; 
(c) AEs of T are only expressions satisfying (a) and (b). 
7. Compositional expressions (CEs) of T 
0 is a C E of T = D f 0 is an A E of T , but 0 is not a P A E of T 
8. Tertiary aspect-expressions (TAEs) of T 
0 is a T A E of T = D f 0 is an A E of T , but 0 is neither a P A E nor a SAE 
of T 
9. Entity-designators (EDs) of T 
0 is an E D of T = ^ 0 is an O D of T , or 0 is an A E of T 
10. Primary sententials (PSLs) of T 
(a) If ß and ß' are EDs of T , then (ß = ß') is a PSL of T ; 
(b) PSLs of T are only expressions satisfying (a). 
7 1. Sententials (SLs) of T 
(a) PSLs of T are SLs of T ; 
(b) if ß and ß' are SLs of T , then n ß , (ßAß') , (ßVß') , (ß^ß'), (ß - ß') are 
SLs of T ; 
(c) if ß is a SL of T in which in certain places X there occurs a certain 
O N of T , namely, 0, and is v a O V of T that does not occur in ß, then - if 
v replaces 0 in all places X (ß<v> resulting from ß) - Avß<v> and 
Vvß<v> are SLs of T ; 
(d) SLs of T are only expressions satisfying (a), (b) and (c). 
12. Primary sentences (PSs) of T 
ß is a PS of T = D f ß is a PSL of T in which no O V of T occurs 
13. Sentences (Ss) of T 
ß is a S of T = D f ß is a SL of T in which no O V of T occurs free. 
7. - 13 determines the syntax of T. The intended interpretation of T 
has been outlined, but of course there remains much to be said about it. 
The logical operators ~n, A , V , D, S 9 /\, V are to be read as 'not', 'and', 
'or' (in the sense o f not neither_, nor__'), 'if_, then__', '_ i f and only 
if_\ 'for all objects', 'for some object'. In view of the intended inter-
pretation relative to Aquinatic doctrine we define; 
D l w(0) : = (f(0) + m(0)) (for all ODs 0 of T) 
D2 a(0): = (f(0) + s(0)) (for all ODs 0 of T) 
Finally, parentheses may be omitted in accordance with the following 
rules: 
(a) External parentheses can be omitted. 
(b) In the sequence +, =, ~i, A , V , Z), ^ binding-power is decreasing 
from left to right. 
(c) In a conjunction (disjunction) the parentheses around an immediate 
member can be omitted if it is itself a conjunction (disjunction). 
VI. Before we go on to formulate in T an axiom-system adequate in the 
intended interpretation of T for pan of Aquinatic ontology, the logic has 
to be described by the use of which we intend to deduce theorems from 
the axioms. It is classical first-order predicate-logic with the identity-
predicate and functional terms. However, there is one deductive restric-
tion: Only ODs of T are quantifiable, which means that the deduction 
rules Avß<v>->ß<0'> and ß<0>-Vvß<v> (->: 'logically implies') may 
only be applied if 0 is an O D of T. This restriction is in keeping with the 
intended interpretation of A and V: 'for all objects', 'for some object'; 
under the intended interpretation an A E of T , for example f(g'), will 
normally not refer to an object but only to an aspect of it. Aspects of 
objects which are not objects are thus not quantified over, and it is 
impossible to directly refer to them; that is, it is impossible to refer to 
them without referring at the same time to some object, which is a 
consequence of there being no simple names in T for aspects of objects 
that are not objects. Under the intended interpretation these semantic 
features mirror the ontologically dependent status of object-aspects 
which are not objects in contrast to the ontologically independent status 
of objects. Aquinas would have said that object-aspects which are not 
objects are less real than objects; the former have their being only in the 
latter. (The second-order deduction rules //*ß'-*ß<0), and 0 does not occur 
free in ß'-> Avß<v>, then ß'-Avß<v> and 7/rß<0>^ß', and 0 does not occur 
free in Vvß< v>-*ß\ then Vvß(v>-*ß> may in any case only be applied ifO 
is an OD of T: f(g') = g'-» Vx(f(x) = x), f(g') does not occur in Vx' 
(x' = g')-»Vx(f(x) = x); but clearly Vx'(x' = g') does not logically imply 
Vx(f(x) = x).) 
Since only ODs of T are to be quantifiable and we nevertheless want 
to make unrestricted use of the deduction-rules referring to identity, 
these cannot be codified in the following manner: -»Ax(x = x), 
-*AxAx'(x = x z> (ß<x> ID ß<x'» ) , but must rather be formulated thus: 
- 0 = 0, - 0 = 0 'D (ß<0> z> ß<0 '» . 
VII. The axiom-system T O ('Thomasic ontology') consists of the fol-
lowing axioms: 
(ß(x) and ß'(x) is a P A E or a S A E of T having x as its OV) 
A l Every S of T having the form 
Ax(ß(x) + ß\x) = ß'(x) + ß(x)) 
is an axiom of T O . 
A2 (a) Every S of T having the form 
Ax(ß(x) + ß(x) = ß(x)) 
is an axiom of T O . 
(b) Every S of T having the form 
Ax(ß(x) + c(x) = ß(x)) 
is an axiom of T O . 
A3 Every S of T having the form 
Ax(ß(x) + ß'(x) = ß(x) => ß'(x) = ß(x) V ß'(x) = c(x)) 
is an axiom of T O 
B l Ax(x = (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x)) 
B2 Ax((f(x) + m(x)) + s(x) = (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x)) 
B3 (a) Ax-nf(x) = m(x) 
(b) Ax-is(x) = m(x) 
(c) Axnf(x) + s(x) = m(x) 
B4 (a) Ax-nx = c(x) 
(b) Ax-if(x) = c(x) 
(C) AX~!S(X) = C(X) 
(d) Ax-f(x) + s(x) = c(x) 
(e) Ax-nf(x) + m(x) = c(x) 
B5 Ax(x = f(x) D m(x) = c(x)) 
B6 Ax(nm(x) = c(x) 3 m(x) + s(x) = c(x)) 
B7 Ax(-im(x) = c(x) => (f(x) + m(x)) + f(x) = c(x) A (f(x) + m(x)) + 
m(x) = c(x)) 
B8 Ax(^f(x) = s(x) D (f(x) + s(x)) + f(x) = c(x) A (f(x) + s(x)) + s(x) = 
c(x)) 
Ad A 1: The.composition-function is commutative. The composition of 
aspect b of an object and aspect c of the same object is identical with the 
composition of aspect c of that object with aspect b of that object. 
Aquinas would surely have agreed. 
Ad A2 and A3: The conjunction of A2(a) and A2 (b) is logically 
equivalent with the converse of A3, Ax(ß'(x) = ß(x) V ß'(x) = c(x) z> 
ß(x) + ß'(x) = ß(x)); and from this we obtain A2' Ax(ß'(x) = ß(x) V ß'(x) 
= c(x) V ß(x) = c(x) 3 ß(x) + ß'(x) = ß(x) V 
ß'(x) + ß(x) = ß'(x)). From A3 on the other hand we get A3' 
Ax(ß(x) + ß'(x) = ß(x) V ß'(x) + ß(x) = ß'(x) => ß'(x) = ß(x) V ß'(x) = c(x) 
V ß(x) = c(x)). This means that from A2 and A3 follows a sentence-form 
stating the necessary and sufficient condition for improper composition. 
We had occasion to mention that object-aspects cannot be proper parts 
of each other; otherwise A2 and A3 could not be formulated in the 
given manner, but would have to take care of the possibility that 'ß'(O) is 
a proper part of ß(0)' is true. (Of course one may say 'm(g) is proper part 
° f w(g) ( = f(g) + m(g))'> D u t this is analogous to saying 'object a is proper 
part of proposition f(a)', not analogous to saying iXx(x = a) is proper part 
of Xx(x = aVx = b) (a b)'. If it were analogous to the latter, then we 
would have w(g) + m(g) = w(g), although we have ~im(g) = w(g) and 
~im(g) = c(g), where 'g' is referring to a material object.) 
Ad B1: An object is composed of its essence and its being, and its 
essence is in turn composed of its pure (substantial) form and its matter. 
Aquinas states this explicitly for material objects (vide quotation 6). In 
view of the possibility of improper composition we can make the 
Aquinatic statement apply to all objects without obtaining conse-
quences that contradict Aquinatic doctrine (as will be seen). 
Ad B2: We have already given a justification of this axiom above (in the 
middle of section III.): the composition of essence and being is identical 
with the composition of actuating form and matter. Therefore, Aquinas 
sometimes says that a material object is composed of its form (actuating 
form) and its matter (vide for instance quotation 2), sometimes that 
there is a double composition in a material object: its essence is com-
posed of its form (pure form) and its matter, and the material object itself 
is composed of its essence and its being (vide quotation 6). Again the 
possibility of improper composition allows us to make an insight pri-
marily reached for material objects apply to all objects. 
Ad B3: The content of B3 is evident in the light of the ontology of 
Aquinas. Neither the pure form nor the actuating form nor the being of 
an object is its matter. It will be proved below that no object is its matter 
and that the essence of no object is the matter of the object. 
Ad B4: This axiom characterizes the function the empty aspect of, which 
Aquinas does not consider, in relation to the other aspect-functions and 
in relation to objects in the following manner: with respect to identity 
between the empty aspect of an object and 'another' aspect of that object 
or the object itself, it only leaves open the possibility that its matter is its 
empty aspect. 
Ad B5: Under the intended interpretation B5 says that if an object is its 
pure form, then it is an immaterial object; which completely agrees with 
what Aquinas says about objects which are forms. 
Ad B6, B7, BS: The axiom B6 has already been justified above (at the 
end of section III.); it expresses the stipulation there proposed. The 
axioms B7 and B8 fulfill the same role as B6 of completing the definition 
of the composition-function for cases in which it is initially not defined. 
We have no information as to what Aquinas considered to result by the 
composition of the essence and the pure form, or the essence and the 
matter of a material object; and we have no information as to what 
Aquinas considered to result by the composition of the actuating form 
and the pure form, or the actuating form and the being of an object 
whose pure form and being are different. Hence we must consider the 
composition-function to be initially not defined for these cases. (Con-
cerning the composition of the matter and being of a material object we 
have positive evidence that Aquinas regarded it as impossible.) B6, B7 
and B8 may be called 'the reduction-axioms' from their important role 
in the reduction of all AEs 'around' a certain O D to basic AEs around it 
and the O D itself. This reduction, programmaticly described in section 
IV., will be carried out in section X . The uses of B7 and B8 in the logical 
reconstruction of Aquinatic ontology are not exhaustively described by 
these remarks. The impression of their ad-hoc-character will be dis-
pelled as we move on to the proving of theorems. 
VIII. 
T l Ax(m(x) = c(x) Z) x= a(x)) 
(An immaterial object is its actuating form) 
Proof: assume m(x) = c(x); by B l x = (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x); hence x = 
(f(x) + c(x)) + s(x); by A2(b) f(x) + c(x) = f(x); hence x = f(x) + s(x), 
hence by D2 x = a(x). 
T2 Ax(x = a(x) Z) m(x) = c(x)) 
(An object that is its actuating form is immaterial) 
Proof: assume x = a(x), hence by D2 x = f(x) + s(x); by B l x = 
(f(x) + m(x)) + s(x); hence f(x) + s(x) = (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x); by B2 
(f(x) + m(x)) + s(x) = (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x); hence f(x) + s(x) = 
(f(x) + s(x)) + m(x), hence (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x) = f(x) + s(x), hence by A3 
m(x) = f(x) + s(x) V m (x) = c(x); by B3(c) nm(x) = f(x) + s(x); hence 
m(x) = c(x). 
T3 Ax(m(x) = c(x) Z) w(x) = f(x)) 
(The essence of an immaterial object is its (pure) form) 
Proof: assume m(x) = c(x); by D l w(x) = f(x) + m(x); hence 
w(x) = f(x) + c(x); by A2(b) f(x) + c(x) = f(x); hence w(x) = f(x). 
T4 Ax(w(x) = f(x) z> m(x) = c(x)) 
(An object whose essence is its form is an immaterial object) 
Proof: assume w(x) = f(x), hence by D l f(x) + m(x) = f(x), hence by A3 
m(x) = f(x) V m(x) = c(x); by B3(a) nm(x) = f(x); hence m(x) = c(x). 
Concerning T3 and T4 compare quotation 1. Concerning T l consider 
the following quotation: 
11. In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus 
individuatio non est per materiam individualem, id est per hanc mate-
riam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae formae 
sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura. 
(Summa theologiae, 1,3,3) 
This evidence for T l is somewhat vitiated by the fact that Aquinas in 
this passage confuses what is valid of pure form with what is valid of 
actuating form. The context makes it clear that he intends to assert 'All 
immaterial objects are their pure forms'. (By the way, in the article from 
which quotation 11 is taken Aquinas identifies essence - 'natura vel 
essentia' - and pure form '<quae> comprehendit in se ilia tantum quae 
cadunt in definitione speciei', which is contradictory to what he says in 
other places; vide quotation 5.) However, by his own lights, this is false. 
A created immaterial object (an angel, for example) is not its pure form, 
and consequently - the essence of an immaterial object being its pure 
form - it is not its essence. Aquinas, however, deduces from 'All 
immaterial objects are their pure forms' - the essence of an immaterial 
object being its pure form - 'All immaterial objects are their essence' 
('Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura'). A created immaterial 
object is not its pure form, because its being is distinct from its essence, 
viz. its pure form: 
12. Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in 
quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine 
materia. 
(De ente et essentia, 5, 31) 
13. oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse praeter formam; et ideo dictum est 
quod intelligentia est forma et esse (De ente et essentia, 4, 26) 
(This last assertion does not hinder Aquinas from asserting a few lines 
further on: 'intelligentiae quidditas est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quid-
ditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa' (De ente et essentia, 4, 
28)) 
This means that a created immaterial object is properly composed of its 
being and its essence, viz. its pure form; hence it is not identical with its 
pure form. Thus Aquinas by the equivocation in his use of the word 
'forma' is led to imagining a proposition valid relative to pureform which 
is not valid relative there to, but rather valid relative to actuating form: 
'In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma ... oportet 
quod ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia'. 
T2 says about objects that are their actuating forms what B5 says 
about objects that are their pure forms: that they are immaterial. If B5 
agrees with Aquinatic doctrine, so does T2. 
T5 Ax(m(x) = c(x) A n w ( x ) = s(x) D n x = f(x)) 
(An immaterial created object is not its pure form) 
Proof: assume m(x) = c(x) A n w ( x ) = s(x), hence by T3 w(x) = f(x); by 
B l and D l x = w(x) + s(x); hence x = f(x) + s(x) A ~if(x) = s(x); assume 
x = f(x); hence f(x) = f(x) + s(x), hence f(x) + s(x) = f(x), hence by A3 
s(x) = f(x) V s(x) = c(x), hence by B4(c) s(x) = f(x) contradicting 
nf(x) = s(x). 
T6 Ax(~ix = f (x) A m(x) = c(x) Z> ~ix = w(x)) 
(An immaterial object that is not its pure form is not its essence) 
Proof: assume ~nx = f(x) A m(x) = c(x), hence by T3 w(x) = f (x ) ; hence 
~ x = w(x). 
T5 and T6 formally state the principles we have just now informally 
made use of. 
T7 Ax(x = f(x) z> x = a(x) A x = s(x) A x = w(x)) 
(An object that is its pure form is its actuating form, its being and its 
essence) 
Proof: assume x = f(x), hence by B5 m(x) = c(x), hence by T l x = a(x), 
hence by D2 x = f(x) + s(x), hence f(x) + s(x) = f(x), hence by A3 
s(x) = f(x) V s(x) = c(x), hence by B4 (c) s(x) = f(x), hence x = s(x), 
hence by B l s(x) = (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x), hence by A l s(x) + (f(x) + m(x)) = 
s(x), hence by A3 f(x) + m(x) = s(x) V f(x) + m(x) = c(x), hence by B4 (e) 
and D l w(x) = s(x), hence x = iv(x). 
T7 contains a principle Aquinas can be said to be using in quotation 11 
to deduce from the invalid sentence Ax(m(x) = c(x) D x = f(x)) the 
invalid sentence Ax(m(x) = c(x) D x = w (x ) ) , namely Ax(x = f(x) D x = 
w(x)). Other principles Aquinas can instead be said to be using in this 
deduction are Ax(m(x) = c(x) 3 w(x) = f(x)) (the most likely candidate) 
and Ax(x = f(x) A m(x) = c(x) ZD x = w(x)). Relative to B5 this latter 
principle is equivalent with Ax(x = f(x) z> x = w(x)); consequently, since 
it is very easy to prove, it opens an easier way than the way via the proof 
of T7 for arriving at Ax(x = f(x) z> x = w(x)): 
T8 Ax(x = f(x) A m(x) = c(x) 3 x = w(x)) 
(An immaterial object that is its pure form is its essence) 
Proof: assume x = f(x) A m(x) = c(x), hence by T3 w(x) = f(x), hence 
x = w(x). 
T7 shows that objects that are their pure form are in a way simple 
objects; we shall have occasion to come back to this. 
T9 Ax(x = w(x) 3 w(x) = s(x)) 
(An object that is its essence is uncreated) 
Proof: assume x = w(x); by B l x = w(x) 4- s(x); hence w(x) + s(x) = w(x), 
hence by A3 s(x) = w(x) V s(x) = c(x), hence by B4 (c) w(x) = s(x). 
T10 Ax(w(x) = s(x)=>x = w(x)) 
(An uncreated object is its essence) 
Proof: assume w(x) = s(x); by B l x = w(x) + s(x); hence x = s(x) + s(x), 
hence by A2 (a) x = s(x); hence x = w(x). 
The proof of T10 contains the proof of 
T l 1 Ax(w(x) = s(x) 3 x = s(x)) 
(An uncreated object is its being) 
And we also have 
T12 Ax(x = s(x) z> w(x) = s(x)) 
(An object that is its being is uncreated) 
Proof: assume x = s(x); by B l x = w(x) + s(x); hence w(x) + s(x) = s(x), 
hence by A l s(x) + w(x) = s(x), hence by A3 w(x) = s(x) V w(x) = c(x), 
hence by B4(e), D l w(x) = s(x). 
We have all the time been reading m(x) = c(x) as 'x is an immaterial 
object' and w(x) = s(x) as 'x is an uncreated object'. According to stipu-
lation the matter of an object is its empty aspect if the object is imma-
terial; if, on the other hand, the object is material, then, clearly, its 
matter is not its empty aspect. This justifies the reading of m(x) = c(x) as 
'x is an immaterial object'. According to Aquinas the totality of objects is 
divided into the one uncreated object, God, and the many created 
objects. God is the only object whose essence is its being: 
14. Hinc est quod proprium nomen Dei ponitur esse QUI EST (Exodus, 
111,14), quia eius solius est quod sua substantia no sit aliud quam suum 
esse. 
(Summa contra gentiles, 2,52) 
Consequently, the essence of every uncreated object is its being; con-
sequently, every object whose essence is its being is uncreated: 
15. cuilibet rei creatae suum esse est ei per aliud; alias non esset creatum. 
Nullius igitur substantiae creatae suum esse est sua substantia. 
(Summa contra gentiles, 2,52) 
This justifies the reading of w(x) = s(x) as 'x is an uncreated object'. 
For convenience w e introduce these two definitions: 
D3 M(0): = nm(0) = c(0) (for all ODs 0 of T) 
D4 C(0): = -iw(0) = s(0) (for all ODs 0 of T) 
With the help of the predicates M and C we now define the four 
principal Aquinatic categories of objects: 
D5 D(0): = iM(0) A iC(0) (for all ODs 0 of T) 
D6 1(0) : = iM(0) A C(0) (for all ODs 0 of T) 
D7 E(0) : = M(0) A -iC(0) (for all ODs 0 of T) 
D8 B(0): = M(0) A C(0) (for all ODs 0 of T) 
According to Aquinatic doctrine the third category is empty. There 
are no material uncreated objects (for example, elementa in the sense of 
the Pre-Socratics, having a quasi-divine character): 
16. Per hoc autem <quod omnia quae sunt, a Deo sunt> excluditur antiquo-
rum naturalium error, qui ponebant corpora quaedam non habere cau-
sam essendi; et etiam quorumdam, qui dicunt Deum non esse causam 
substantiae caeli, sed solum motus. 
(Summa contra gentiles, 2,15) 
In T O we can prove 
T13 n V x E ( x ) 
(There are no material uncreated objects) 
Proof: By D7 - i V xE(x) is equivalent with n V x(M(x) A ~~iC(x)), that is, 
with Ax(M(x) 3 C(x)), which is equivalent by D3 and D4 with 
Ax(-im(x) = c(x) 3 nw(x) = s(x)), that is, with Ax(w(x) = s(x) 3 m(x) = 
c(x)); the latter is proved as follows: assume w(x) = s(x), hence s(x) + f(x) 
= w(x) + f(x), hence by D l s(x) + f(x) = (f(x) + m(x)) + f(x); by B4 (d) 
~if(x) + s(x) = c(x), hence by A1 ~~is(x) + f(x) = c(x); hence n (f(x) + m(x)) 
+ f(x) = c(x), hence by B7 m(x) = c(x). 
From quotation 15 we may gather: If the being of an object is caused by 
another object, then this being is different from the essence of the object. The 
converse If the being ofan object is differentfrom the essence ofthe object, then 
this being is caused by another object is also valid according to Aquinas: 
17. oportet quod omnis talis res, cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua, habet 
esse ab alio. 
(De ente et essentia, 4,27; vide also Summa theologiae, 1,3,4) 
Hence we can read C(x), that is, ~iw(x) = s(x) as 'the being of x is caused 
by another object*; ~~iC(x), that is, w(x) = s(x) as 'the being of x is not 
caused by another object', which for Aquinas is equivalent to 'the being 
of x is not caused by any object', self-causation being impossible accord-
ing to Aquinas: 
18. nec tarnen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui 
ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. 
(Summa theologiae, 1,2,3) 
19. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel 
quidditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente; quia sic aliqua res esset causa 
sui ipsius, et aiiqua res seipsam in esse produceret, quod est impossi-
bile. 
(De ente et essentia, 4,27) 
From T 1 3 we can easily deduce: 
T 1 4 Ax(M(x) = B(x)) 
(The material objects are the contingent bodies) 
Proof: from T 1 3 by D7 Ax(M(x) 3 C(x)), hence Ax(M(x) = M(x) A 
C(x)), hence by D8 Ax(M(x) m B(x)). 
T15 Ax(nC(x) ^ D(x)) 
(The uncreated - uncaused - objects are the divine objects) 
Proof: from T 1 3 Ax(iC(x) => H M ( X ) ) , hence Ax(nC(x) = nM(x) A 
iC(x)), hence by D5 Ax(nC(x) * D(x)). 
D5 mirrors the Aquinatic conception of divinity: a divine object is 
an uncreated (uncaused) immaterial object. This conception is the 
Judaeo-Christian conception of divinity, but with a special Aristotelian 
interpretation resulting from taking 'uncreated object' to mean an object 
whose essence is its being. 
It is problematic whether there are divine objects. It is at least 
equally problematic whether there are intelligences ('substantiae creatae 
intellectuales <immateriales>\ 'intelligentiae'). In accordance with pre-
vailing agnosticism neither VxD(x) nor Vxl(x) (nor their negations) 
can be proved in T O , although the truth of VxD(x) and Vxl(x) (under 
the given interpretation of T) would have been indubitable for Aqui-
nas. 
In the ontological doctrines here referred to Aquinas does not con-
sider so-called abstract objects, numbers, for example, or geometrical 
figures (which one might think of subsuming under category I); hence 
they do not belong to the universe of discourse. There is also a positive 
justification for this: 
20. corpus mathematicum non est per se existens, ut Philosophus probat 
(Summa contra gentiles, 1,20) 
Abstract 'objects' are not objects in the full sense ('substantiae') for 
Aquinas. 
In a sequel to this paper extensions of T O are considered in which 
Vxl(x) and VxD(x) are provable. T O , indeed, is very weak in its exis-
tential assumptions; not even VxM(x), which corresponds to the entire-
ly (?) unproblematic assertion that there are material objects, can be 
deduced in it. However, T O , while implying no further existential 
commitment than that there is at least one object, implies (under the 
given interpretation of T) that there are no material uncreated (un-
caused) objects. Here T O is following Aquinas. 
The second part of the proof of T13 can be re-ordered in the 
following manner: Ax ~i s(x) + f(x) = c(x) by B4(d) and At , hence 
Ax(w(x) = s(x) 3 -iw(x) + f(x) = c(x)); Ax(~i m(x) = c(x) Z> w(x) + f(x) = 
c(x)) by B7, D l ; hence A*("n m(x) = c(x) ~D ~iw(x) = s(x)). In this way it 
becomes easier to informally rephrase the proof in order to bring out the 
intuitive idea behind it: The pure form (as well as the essence) of an 
object enters into composition with the being of the object; here we may 
cite 
21. esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae 
(Summa theologiae, 1,3,4) 
Hence, if the essence of an object is identical with the being of the object, 
then its pure form enters into composition with its essence. But the pure 
form of a material object does not enter into composition with its 
essence; there is nothing in a material object constituted by both of them. 
Hence the essence of a material object is different from its being. 
IX. By D5, T i l and T10 follow theorems about divine objects that 
correspond to Aquinatic dicta about God: 
T16 (a) Ax(D(x) - i M(x)) - 22. Deus non est corpus 
(Summa contra gentiles, 
1,20) 
(b) Ax(D(x)Dw(x) = s(x)) 
(c) Ax(D(x)Dx = w(x)) 
(d) A X ( D ( X ) D X = S(X)) 
By T13 and T9 we obtain 
T17 Ax(M(x)D-ix = w(x)) 
And Aquinas says accordingly: 
26. in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, necesse est quod differant natura 
vel essentia et suppositum <seu substantia individua > 
(Summa theologiae, 1,3,3) 
In reverse order, Aquinas says: 
27. Si autem sint aliquae formae creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se 
subsistentes, ut quidam de angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae 
secundum quid, inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque 
contrahuntur per aliquam materiam: sed quia forma creata sic subsistens 
habet esse, et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit 
receptum et contractum ad determinatam naturam. 
(Summa theologiae, 1,7,2) 
And in accordance with this quotation we have 
T18 (a) Ax(I(x)Dx = a(x)) (by D6 and T l ) 
(b) Ax(I(x) 3 i x = s(x)) (by D6 and T12) 
Al l this amply shows that our theorems and definitions mirror Aqui-
natic doctrine. 
In Summa theologiae, 1,3,3 Aquinas deduces T 16(c) from the invalid 
sentence Ax(m(x) = c(x) 3 x = f(x)) (S) ('Every immaterial object is its 
- 23. In Deo non est aliud essentia 
vel quidditas, quam suum 
esse 
(Summa contra gentiles, 
1,22) 
- 24. Deus est sua essentia 
(Summa contra gentiles, 
1,21) 
- 25. Deus non solum est sua es-
sentia, ut ostensum est, sed 
etiam suum esse 
(Summa theologiae, 1,3,4) 
pure form') with the help of the principle Ax(m(x) = c(x) Z> w(x) = f(x)) 
(T3) and the principle Ax(D(x) => m(x) = c(x)) (T16(a)). From S and T3 
he first gets Ax(m(x) = c(x) 3 x = w(x)) (which is invalid) and then, in 
continuation of quotation 11, he writes: 
28. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex materia et forma <T16 (a)>, ut 
ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua deitas <id est, sua essentia>, sua 
vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur. 
Thus, starting from an invalid premise, he obtains a valid conclusion. 
The argument in Summa theologiae, 1,3,3 may also be taken to reach 
Ax(D(x) z> x = f(x)), starting out from S and using T l 6 (a). This sentence 
('Every divine object is its pure form'), too, inspite of the invalid premise 
from which it is derived, is Aquinatically valid, as is Ax(D(x) ZD x = a(x)) 
('Every divine object is its actuating form'), which we get from T16 (a) 
by T l : 
29. unumquodque agens agit per suam formam: unde secundum quod ali-
quid se habet ad suam formam, sic se habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod 
igitur primum est et per se agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. 
Deus autem est primum agens, cum sit prima causa efflciens, ut ostensum 
est. Est igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et 
forma. 
(Summa theologiae, 1,3,2) 
In this quotation Aquinas certainly did not intend to refer to pure form 
rather than to actuating form, or vice versa, since he did not distinguish 
between them. Indeed, with respect to divine objects Aquinas is right in 
this. The actuating and the pure form of a divine object are identical. 
Hence quotation 29 supports Ax(D(x) z> x = f(x)) as well as Ax(D(x) 3 x 
= a(x)), these sentences being provably equivalent. We have: 
T19 Ax(D(x)Da(x) = f(x)) 
Proof: assume D(x), hence by D5 nM(x) A ~iC(x), hence by D3 and D4 
m(x) = c(x) A w(x) = s(x), hence by D l m(x) = c(x) A f(x) + m(x) = s(x), 
hence f(x) + c(x) = s(x), hence by A2(b) f(x) = s(x), hence 
f(x) + s(x) = f(x) + f(x), hence by D2 and A2 (a) a(x) = f(x). 
We can also prove the cor r T19: 
T20 Ax(a(x) = f(x)DD(x)j 
(If the actuating form of an object is its pure form, then the object is 
divine) 
Proof: assume a(x) = f(x), hence by D2 f(x) + s(x) = f(x), hence by A3 
s(x) = f(x) Vs(x) = c(x), hence by B4(c) s(x) = f(x); by B l 
x = (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x), hence by B2 x = (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x); hence 
x = (f(x) + f(x)) + m(x), hence by A2 (a) x = f(x) + m(x), hence by D l 
x = w(x), hence by T9 w(x) = s(x), hence by D4 ~C(x), hence by T15 
D(x). 
T l 9 and T20 make precise what is meant by 'the pure form of an object is 
normally distinct from its actuating form'. The pure form of an object is 
distinct from its actuating form if and only if it is not a divine object, 
what, clearly, is normally the case. 
There are many equivalences regarding the predicate D which are 
provable in T O , beside the equivalence T15 and the trivial definitional 
equivalence: 
T21 (a) Ax(D(x) = a(x) = f(x)) (by T19, T20) 
(b) Ax(D(x) « x = w(x)) (by T15, D4, T9, T10) 
(c) Ax(D(x) s x = s(x)) (by T15, D4, T i l , T12) 
(d) Ax(D(x)-s(x) = f(x)) 
Proof: from a(x) = f(x) s(x) = f(x) (vide the proof of T20); from s(x) = f(x) 
a(x) = f(x) (vide the proof of T19); hence by T21 (a) T21 (d). 
(e) Ax(D(x)-x = f(x)) 
Proof: from D(x) x = s(x) A s(x) = f(x) by T21 (c) and T 21 (d), hence 
x = f(x); from x = f(x) by T7 x = s(x), hence by T21 (c) D(x). 
(f) Ax(D(x)-s(x) = a(x)) 
Proof: from D(x) a(x) = f(x) A s(x) = f(x) by T21 (a) and T21 (d), hence 
s(x) = a(x); from s(x) = a(x) by D2 s(x) = f(x) + s(x), hence by A3 f(x) = 
s(x) V f(x) = c(x), hence by B4 (b) f(x) = s(x), hence by T21 (d) D(x). 
(g) Ax(D(x) - w(x) = a(x)) 
Proof: from D(x) x = f(x) A x = w(x) A a(x) = f(x) by T21 (e), T21 (b) and 
T21 (a), hence w(x) = a(x); from w(x) = a(x) by D1 and D2 f(x) + m(x) = 
f(x) + s(x), hence by B l x = (f(x) + s(x)) + s(x), hence by B4 (a) 
i (f(x) + s(x)) + s(x) = c(x), hence by B8 f(x) = s(x), hence by T21 (d) 
D(x). 
We have a shorter sequence of in T O provable equivalences regarding 
the predicate - i M : 
T22 (a) Ax(-iM(x) = x = a(x)) (by T l , T2, D3) 
(b) AX(HM(X) = w(x) = f(x)) (by T3, T4, D3) 
It is interesting to compare T22 (a) with T21 (e), and T22 (b) with 
T21 (g), and the two pairs with each other. In the pair T22 (b), T21 (g) 
the role of f(x) and a(x) is inverse to the role of f(x) and a(x) in the pair 
T22 (a), T 21(e). 
From T21 and T22 follows the absolute simplicity of a divine object. 
An object is said to be absolutely simple if all its (essential) aspects that are 
different from its empty aspect are identical with the object itself (in 
other words, if it has no real components). 
T23 Ax(D(x)Dx = f (x )Ax = w(x) A x = s(x) A x = a(x)) 
(A divine object is absolutely simple) 
Proof: assume D(x), hence n M ( x ) by D5; hence the succedent of T23 by 
T21 and T22; hence every aspect of x that is different from its empty 
aspect is identical with x. (The theorem warranting the conclusion that 
f(x), w(x), s(x), a(x) are all the non-empty aspects of x is given below; 
vide T28.) 
It can easily be seen that the converse of T23 is also provable. T23 
corresponds to the Aquinatic doctrine of the total simplicity of God: 
30. quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse manife-
stum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit compo-
sitio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; neque com-
positio formae et materiae: neque in eo sit aliud natura et suppositum; 
neque aliud essentia et esse ... manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo 
compositus est, sed est omnino simplex. ... Unde, cum Deus sit ipsa 
forma, vel potius ipsum esse, nullo modo compositus esse potest 
(Summa theologiae, 1,3,7) 
The degree of composition of an object is the number of its real com-
ponents, that is, the number of its (essential) aspects that are different 
from its empty aspect and different from the object itself. Evidently the 
degree of composition of a divine object is zero. 
An object is said to be absolutely composite if its degree of composition 
is maximal. Material objects are absolutely composite, as we shall see. 
We first prove the following two theorems: 
T24 Ax-ix = m(x) 
(No object is its matter) 
Proof: assume x = m(x); by B l x = (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x), hence by B2 
x = (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x); hence m(x) = (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x), hence by A l 
m(x) + (f(x) + s(x)) = m(x), hence by A3 f(x) + s(x) = m(x) V f(x) + s(x) = 
c(x), what contradicts B3 (c) and B4 (d). 
Aquinas says: 
31. esse autem non dicitur de materia, sed de toto; unde materia non potest 
dici quod est, sed ipsa substantia est id quod est 
(Summa contra gentiles, 2,54) 
T25 Ax I w(x) = m(x) 
(The essence of no object is its matter) 
Proof: assume w(x) = m(x), hence by D l f(x) + m(x) = m(x), hence by A l 
m(x) + f(x) = m(x), hence by A3 f(x) = m(x) V f(x) = c(x), what contra-
dicts B3(a) and B4(b). 
And Aquinas says: 
32. materia non est ipsa substantia rei; nam sequeretur omnes formas esse 
accidentia, sicut antiqui naturales opinabantur; sed materia est pars sub-
stantiae 
(Summa contra gentiles, 2,54) 
33. Quod enim materia sola rei non sit essentia, planum est, quia res per 
essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est, et in specie ordinatur vel in genere; 
sed materia neque cognitionis principium <est (?)>, neque secundum earn 
aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quo <?: 
quod?> aliquid actu est 
(De ente et essentia, 2,5) 
We then have 
T26 (a) Ax(M(x) Z> nx = m(x) A nx = f(x) A nx = w(x) A -ix = s(x) A 
-ix = a(x)) 
(b) Ax(M(x) 3 nm(x) = f(x) A n m ( x ) = w(x) A n m ( x ) = s(x) A 
nm(x) = a(x) A nf(x) = w(x) A nf(x) = s(x) A nf(x) = a(x) A 
nw(x) = s(x) A n w ( x ) = a(x) A ns(x) = a(x)) 
Proof: (a) assume M(x); then n x = m(x) by T24; nx = f(x) by B5, D3; 
nx = w(x) by T21 (b), T16 (a); nx = s(x) by T21 (c), T16 (a); nx = a(x) 
by T2, D3; 
(b) assume M(x); then nm(x) = f(x) by B3 (a); nm(x) = w(x) by T25; 
nm(x) = s(x) by B3 (b); nm(x) = a(x) by B3 (c), D2; nf(x) = w(x) by T4, 
D3; nf(x) = s(x) by T21 (d), T16 (a); -^ f(x) = a(x) by T21 (a), T16 (a); 
nw(x) = s(x) by T15, T16(a), D4; nw(x) = a(x) by T21 (g), T16(a); 
ns(x) = a(x) by T21 (f)> T16 (a). 
From T26 (and B4) it is apparent that a material object has at least five 
real components; there cannot be more than five real components in an 
object (vide T28); hence the degree of composition of a material object is 
maximal, and hence it is absolutely composite. 
The intelligences are neither absolutely simple nor absolutely com-
posite. While the degree of composition of divine objects is zero, and 
that of material objects five, the degree of composition of created 
immaterial substances is two: 
T27 (a) Ax(I(x) Z> n x = f(x) A"HX = w(x) A n x = s(x) A x = a(x)) 
(b) Ax(I(x) =) f(x) = w(x) A n f ( x ) = s(x)) 
Proof: (a) assume I(x), hence by D6 ^ M ( x ) A C ( x ) ; then by T15, T21(e) 
- i x = f ( x ) ; by T l 5, T21 (b) n x = w (x) ; by T18 (b) n x = s(x); by T18 (a) 
x = a(x). 
(b) assume I(x), hence by D6 n M ( x ) A C ( x ) ; then by T3, D3 f(x) = w(x); 
by T15, T21(d) - i f ( x ) = s(x); 
by T27 (a) (and B4) f (x ) , w(x) and s(x) are real components of x , and they 
are the only real components of x (vide T28); of these only two are 
distinct (by T27 (b)). 
Occasionally Aquinas calls intelligences as well as God 'substantiae 
simpiices' (vide quotation 1). However: 
34. Non est autem opinandum, quamvis substantiae intellectuales non sint 
corporeae nec ex materia et forma compositae nec in materia existentes 
sicut formae immateriales <?; materiales?>, quod propter hoc divinae 
simplicitati adaequentur. 
(Summa contra gentiles, 2,52; see also quotation 13) 
X. Definition: An A E of T a is in T O reducible to the EDs of T ß u p n 
if and only if a = ß 1 V.. . V a = ß n is provable in T O . 
Reduction Theorem: If 0 is an O D of T and ß(0) is an A E of T , then ß(0) is 
reducible in T O to 0, f(0), m(0), s(0), f(0) + m(0), f(0) + s(0) and c(0) (for 
convenience this sequence is named Y). 
Proof: let 0 be an O D of T ; there are four PAEs of T around 0: f(0), m(0), 
s(0) and c(0); with these 16 SAEs of T around 0 can be formed, and 128 
TAEs of T around 0; there are no other AEs of T around 0. 
Because of A l 6 of the 16 SAEs of T around 0 are each reducible in 
T O to the respective converse; hence they are each reducible in T O to Y 
if the remaining 10 are each reducible in T O to Y ; let the remaining 10 
be for example: 
(i) c(0) + c(0), m(0) + m(0), f(0) + f(0), s(0) + s(0); 
(ii) m(0) + c(0), f(0) + c(0), s(0) + c(0); 
(iii) m(0) + s(0); 
(iv) f(0) + s(0),f(0) + m(0); 
by A2(a) the AEs in row (i) are each reducible in T O to a P A E of T 
around 0, hence to Y ; 
by A2(b) the AEs in row (ii) are each reducible in T O to a P A E of T 
around 0, hence to Y ; 
by B6, A l , A2(b) the A E in row (iii) is reducible in T O to c(0), s(0), 
hence to Y ; 
the AEs in row (iv) are each trivially reducible in T O to Y. 
We have now established 
Lemma: Every S A E of T around 0 is reducible in T O to Y. 
Half of the T A E s of T around 0 are by A l each reducible in T O to 
the respective converse, for example in such a manner that each con-
verse has the form (ß(0) + ß'(0)) + ß"(0); hence they are each reducible 
in T O to Y , if each respective converse is reducible in T O to Y ; for these 
converses, each having the form (ß(0) + ß'(0)) + ß"(0), we obtain: 
if ß(0) + ß'(0) is o(0) + a(0), then the A E is reducible in T O to a S A E of 
T around 0 by A2(a), hence to Y by Lemma; 
if ß(0) + ß'(0) is a(0) + c(0) or c(0) + a(0), then the A E is reducible in T O 
to a S A E of T around 0 by A2(b) and A l , hence to Y by Lemma; 
if ß(0) + ß'(0) is f(0) + m(0) or m(0) + f(0); 
then, if ß"(0) is s(0), the A E is reducible in T O to 0 by B l and A l , hence 
to Y ; 
then, if ß"(0) is c(0), the A E is reducible in T O to f(0) + m(0) by A2(b) 
and A l , hence to Y ; 
then, if ß"(0) is f(0), the A E is reducible in T O to c(0), f(0) by B7 , A l 
and A2, hence to Y ; 
then, if ß"(0) is m(0), the A E is reducible in T O to c(0), f(0) by B7, A l 
and A2(b), hence to Y ; 
if ß(0) + ß'(0) is m(0) + S(0) or s(0) + m(0); 
then, if ß"(0) is s(0), the A E is reducible in T O to s(0) by B6, A l and A2, 
hence to Y ; 
then, if ß"(0) is c(0), the A E is reducible in T O to a S A E of T around 0 by 
A2(b), hence to Y by Lemma; 
then, if ß"(0) is f(0), the A E is reducible in T O to f(0), f(0) + s(0) by B6, 
A2(b), A l , hence to Y ; 
then, if ß"(0) is m(0), the A E is reducible in T O to m(0), s(0) by B6, 
A2(b), A l , hence to Y ; 
if ß'(0) + ß"(0) is f(0) + s(0) or s(0) + f(0); 
then, if ß"(0) is s(0), the A E is reducible in T O to c(0), f(0) by B8, A2(a), 
A l , hence to Y ; 
then, if ß"(0) is c(0), the A E is reducible in T O to f(0) + s(0) by A2(b) 
and A l , hence to Y ; 
then, if ß"(0) is f(0), the A E is reducible in T O to c(0), f(0) by B8, A2(a), 
A l , hence to Y ; 
then, if ß"(0) is m(0), the A E is reducible in T O to 0 by B2, B l , A l , 
hence to Y . 
We have now established 
Lemma*: Every T A E of T around 0 is reducible in T O to Y. 
Since every P A E of T around 0 is trivially reducible in T O to Y , and 
since every A E of T around 0 is either a P A E or a SAE or a T A E around 
0, we obtain by Lemma and Lemma*: 
Every AE of T around 0 is reducible in TO to Y. 
This result establishes the Reduction Theorem. 
From the Reduction Theorem follows (by making use of D l and D2) 
(ß(x) is any A E of T around x) 
T28 Ax(ß(x) = x V ß(x) = f(x) V ß(x) = m(x) V ß(x) = s(x) V ß(x) = 
w(x) V ß(x) = a(x) V ß(x) = c(x)) 
T28 is logically equivalent with Ax(~iß(x) = xA~iß (x ) = c(x) 3 ß(x) = 
f(x) V ß(x) = m(x) V ß(x) = s(x) V ß(x) = w(x) V ß(x) = a(x)), which says 
that there are at most five real components in an object, namely f(x), 
m(x), s(x), w(x) and a(x). 
A PSL of T is called 'undecided in T O ' if and only if neither itself nor 
its negation are provable in T O . It can easily be shown that of the PSLs 
of T which are formed out of irreducible AEs of T (and 0) and which 
contain only the O D of T 0, at most (and very probably exactly) the 
following are undecided in T O (and PSLs equivalent with them by A l 
and the symmetry of identity): m(0) = c(0), f(0) = 0, f(0) = s(0), f(0) = f(0) 
+ m(0), f(0) = f(0) + s(0), s(0) = 0, s(0) = f(0) + m(0), s(0) = f(0) + s(0), f(0) 
+ s(0) = 0, f(0) + m(0) = 0, f(0) + s(0) = f(0) + m(0). These SLs can be 
grouped in two equivalence-lists based on the proved theorems: 
Divinity Immateriality 
f(0) = 0 
s(0) = 0 
f(0) = s(0) m(0) = c(0) 
f(0) + m(0) = 0 f(0) + s(0) = 0 
f(0) = f(0) + s(0) f(0) = f(0) + m(0) 
s(0) = f(0) + m(0) 
s(0) = f(0) + s(0) 
f(0) + s(0) = f(0) + m(0) 
Every SL in the left list implies every SL in the right list. 
If 0 is an O D of T and ß(0) = ß'(0) a PSL of T (ß(0), ß'(0) may be the 
same expression as 0) we can show: 
T29 ß(0) = ß'(0) = ß(0) = r(0) A ß'(0) = r'(0) A r(0) = r'(0) V 
ß(0) = r(0) A ß'(0) = k'(0) A r(0) = k\0) V 
ß(0) = k(0) A ß'(0) = r'(0) A k(0) = r'(0) V 
ß(0) = k(0) A ß'(0) = k'(0) A k(0) = k'(0) 
(where r(0), k(0), r'(0), k'(0) belong to Y ; r(0), k(0) 
are the ultimate reducts of ß(0), r'(0), k\0) are 
the ultimate reducts of ß'(0); possibly some or all 
expressions out of r(0), k(0), r'(0), k'(0) are identical.) 
Proof: the proof going from the right side of the equivalence to the left is 
trivial; assume ß(0) = $\0); by the Reduction Theorem we have (ß(0) = 
r(0) V ß(0) = k(0)) A (ß'(0) = r'(0) V ß'(0) = k'(0)), hence ß(0) = r(0) A 
ß'(0) = rXO) V ß(0) = r(0) A ß'(0) = k'(0) V ß(0) = k(0) A ß'(0) = r'(0) V 
ß(0) = k(0) A ß'(0) = k'(0), hence by ß(0) = ß'(0) the right side of the 
equivalence. 
For obvious reasons T29 may be called the Normal Form Theorem. Here 
is an example of its application: 
m(x) + s(x) = m(x) = m(x) + s(x) = c(x) A m(x) = m(x) A c(x) = m(x) V 
m(x) + s(x) = c(x) A m(x) = m(x) A c(x) = m(x) V 
m(x) + s(x) = s(x) A m(x) = m(x) A s(x) = m(x) V 
m(x) + s(x) = s(x) A m(x) = m(x) A s(x) = m(x) 
hence 
m(x) + s(x) = m(x) = m(x) + s(x) = c(x) A c(x) = m(x) V m(x) + s(x) = 
s(x) A s(x) = m(x), 
hence by B3(b) 
m(x) + s(x) = m(x) = m(x) + s(x) = c(x) A c(x) = m(x), 
hency by A l , A2(b), B4(c) nm (x) + s(x) = m(x). 
XI. We now proceed to the proof of the consistency of T O . The con-
sistency of T O will be proved by providing a model for it in an inter-
preted semiformal language T' that contains the language T. 
The ODs of T are the second-order ODs of T ' ; these refer to the 
circles in a plane (which have finite positive radius); they are identified 
with certain sets of points in that plane. (The points inside a circle 
belong to a circle.) The first-order ODs of V refer to the points in the 
plane. Moreover there are designators referring to real numbers. While 
the second-order OVs of T ' are x, x', x " , t h e first-order OVs of T ' are 
y, y\ y",... • 
In a circle x conceived to be a set of points there can be distinguished 
certain proper subsets; for example, the set to which belongs only the 
centre of x, the set of all points in the periphery of x, the set of all points 
which lie between the centre and the periphery of x. We define: 
For all second-order ODs 0 of T ' : 
(a) m(0) : = Xy (y = the center of 0) 
(The center of 0 is the point of 0 whose distance from any 
two points of 0 that have distance k is k/2, where k is the 
furthest distance between points of 0.) 
(b) f(0): = Xy (y lies between the center of 0 and the periphery of 
0) 
(y lies between the centre of 0 and the periphery of 0 iff 
Vy' (y' is in the periphery of 0 A y is between the centre of 
0 and y*).) 
(c) s(0): = Xy (y is in the periphery of 0) 
(y is in the periphery of 0 iff yeO A Vy' (y'sO A distance 
(y.y') = k)0 
(d) c(0): = the empty set (Xy(y 4= y)) 
(e) a is connected with ß : = ~ia = ß A 
Vy Vy' (yea A y'eß A y' can be reached 
from y without touching a point that 
belongs neither to a nor to ß) 
V 
na = ß A (a* Xy (y 4= y) V ß = Xy(y 4= 
y)) 
(for all designators a, ß referring to sets of points in the plane) 
(f) a + ß : = Xy ((a is connected with ß A a and ß have no common 
element V a = ß) A (ysa V yeß)) 
With the help of these definitions we can prove the axioms of T O on the 
basis of certain elementary geometrical facts about circles and funda-
mental principles of set theory (the only sets used are sets of individuals, 
i.e. points): 
Proof ofA1: ß(x) is connected with ß'(x) = ß'(x) is connected with ß(x), 
as can be seen from (e); hence Ay((ß(x) is connected with ß'(x) A ß(x) 
and ß'(x) have no common element V ß(x) = ß'(x)) A (yeß(x) V yeß'(x)) 
s (ß'(x) is connected with ß(x) A ß'(x) and ß(x) have no common 
element V ß*(x) = ß(x)) A (yeß'(x) V yeß(x))), hence by (f) and the 
principles of set-theory ß(x) + ß'(x) = ß'(x) + ß(x). 
Proof of A2(a): clearly Ay((ß(x) is connected with ß(x) A ß(x) and ß(x) 
have no common element V ß(x) = ß(x)) A (yeß(x) V yeß(x)) = yeß(x)), 
hence by (f) and the principles of set-theory ß(x) + ß(x) = ß(x). 
Proof of A2'(b): (i) assume (ß(x) is connected with c(x) A ß(x) and c(x) 
have no element in common V ß(x) = c(x)) A (ysß(x) V yec(x)), hence 
by (d) (yeß(x) V ytXy' (y 4=y')), hence, since ~iyeXyy (y'4= y'), ysß(x); 
(ii) assume yeß(x), hence (ysß(x) V ye^ y' (y' 4= y')); c(x) = XyJ (y' 4= y') 
by (d); hence i ß ( x ) = c(x) A (ß(x) = Xf (y' =# y') V c(x) = Xy' (y> * y')), 
hence ß(x) is connected with c(x); ß(x) and c(x) have no common 
element, since c(x) = Xyy (y' 4= y'); 
from (i) and (ii) by (f) ß(x) + c(x) = ß(x). 
Proof of A 3 : assume ß(x) + ß'( x ) — ß(x); assume iß'(x) = c(x); what must 
be deduced is ß\x) = ß(x); 
(i) assume -iVy(yEß(x)), hence ß(x) = Xy{y 4= y); because of "nß'(x) = c(x) 
we have by (d) Vy'(y'eß'(x)); y'sß(x) + ß*(x) by (f), since (y'sß(x) V 
y'eß'(x)) A ß(x) is connected with ß'(x) A ß(x) and ß'(x) have no 
common element (ß(x) = ky(y #= y), ^ß'(x) = A.y(y 4= y)); hence 
~iß(x) + ß'(x) = ß(x), contradicting the first assumption; (i) shows Vy 
(yeß(x)); 
(ii) assume yeß(x), hence yeß(x) + ß'(x) (since ß(x) + ß'(x) = ß(x)), hence 
by (f) ß(x) is connected with ß'(x) A ß(x) and ß'(x) have no common 
element V ß(x) = ß'(x); assume ß(x) is connected with ß'(x) A ß(x) and 
ß'(x) have no common element; because of ~ißXx) = c(x) we have by (d) 
V y ^ e ß ' « ) ; y'eß(x) + ß'(x) by (f), since (y'eß(x) V y'eß'(x)) A ß(x) is 
connected with ß'(x) A ß(x) and ß'(x) have no common element; but 
•ny,eß(x), since ß(x) and ß'(x) have no common element; hence 
~iß(x) + ß'(x) = ß(x), contradicting the first assumption; consequently 
ß ' « = ß(x); 
(ii) shows Vy(yeß(x)) z> ß'(x) = ß(x); 
from the results of (i) and (ii) we obtain ß'(x) = ß(x). 
Proof ofB1: (i) assume yex, hence, since x is a circle, by (a), (b), (c) yem(x) 
V yef(x) V yes(x); 
in the first and second case: yef(x) + m(x) by (£), since in the first and 
second case (yef(x) V yem(x)) A f(x) is connected with m(x) A f(x) and 
m(x) have no element in common; hence ye(f(x) + m(x)) + s(x) by (f), 
since (yef(x) + m(x) V yss(x)) A f(x) + m(x) is connected with s(x) A 
f(x) + m(x) and s(x) have no element in common (always considering 
that x is a circle); 
in the third case: ye (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x) by (f), since (yef(x) + m(x) V 
yss(x)) A f(x) + m(x) is connected with s(x) A f(x) + m(x) and s(x) have 
no common element; 
(ii) assume ye(f(x) + m(x)) + s(x), hence by (f) (yef(x) + m(x) V yes(x)), 
hence by (f) (yef(x) V yem(x) V yes(x)), hence, since x is a circle, by (a), 
(b), (c) yex. 
Proof of B2: (i) assume ye(f(x) + m(x)) + s(x), hence by (f) yef(x) + m(x) 
V yes(x), hence by (f) yef(x) V yem(x) V yes(x); 
in thefirst and third case: yef(x) + s(x) by (f), since (yef(x) V yes(x)) A f(x) 
is connected with s(x) A f(x) and s(x) have no element in common; 
hence je(f(x) + s(x)) + m(x) by (f), since (yef(x) + s(x) V yem(x)) A 
f(x) + s(x) is connected with m(x) A f(x) + s(x) and m(x) have no com-
mon element; 
in the second case: js(f(x) + s(x)) + m(x) by (f), since (yef(x) + s(x) V 
yem(x)) A f(x) + s(x) is connected with m(x) A f(x) + s(x) and m(x) have 
no common element; 
(ii) assume ye(f(x) + s(x)) -I- m(x), hence by (£) yef(x) V yes(x) V 
yem(x); 
in the first and third case: yef(x) + m(x) by (f) since (yef(x) V ysm(x)) A 
f(x) is connected with m(x) A f(x) and m(x) have no common element; 
hence je(f(x) + m(x)) +s(x) by ( f) , since (yef(x) 4-m(x) V yes(x)) A 
f(x) + m(x) is connected with s(x) A f(x) 4- m(x) and s(x) have no com-
mon element; 
in the second case: ys(f(x) + m(x)) + s(x), since (yef(x) + m(x) V yes(x)) A 
f(x) + m(x) is connected with s(x) A f(x) + m(x) and s(x) have no com-
mon element. 
Proof of B3 and B4: on the basis of (a) - (f) and because of AxCircle(x), 
B3 and B4 are immediately evident. 
Proof of BS: B5 results trivially, since Ax~ix = f(x). 
Proof of B6: since Ax~nm(x) = c(x), B6 is equivalent to 
Ax(m(x) + s(x) = c(x)); assume y£m(x) 4- s(x), hence by (f) (m(x) is con-
nected with s(x) A m(x) and s(x) have no common element V 
m(x) = s(x)) A (yem(x) V yes(x)); but according to (a), (c) and (e) and 
AxCircle(x), m(x) is not connected with s(x) A m(x) + s(x); hence 
nVy(yem(x) + s(x)), hence m(x) + s(x) = Xy(y 4= y), hence by (d) 
m(x) 4- s(x) = c(x). 
Proof of B7: since Ax"m(x) = c(x), B7 is equivalent to 
Ax((f(x) + m(x)) + f(x) « c(x)) A Ax((f(x) + m(x)) + m(x) = c(x)); 
(i) assume ye(f(x) 4- m(x)) + f(x), hence by (f) (yef(x) + m(x) V yef(x)) A 
(f(x) 4- m(x) is connected with f(x) A f(x) 4- m(x) and f(x) have no com-
mon element V f(x) + m(x) = f(x)); but f(x)4-m(x) and f(x) have a 
common element A f(x) + m(x) 4= f(x): Ay(yef(x) 3 yef(x) 4- m(x)) A 
Vy(yef(x)), Vy(yem(x)) A f(x) and m(x) have no common element; 
consequently ~iVy(ye(f(x) + m(x)) 4- f(x)), hence (f(x) 4- m(x)) 4- f(x) = 
*y(y * y). h c n c e by (d) ( fW + m( x)) + f « = c W i 
(ii) assume ye(f(x) 4-m(x)) 4-m(x); continue mutatis mutandis as in 
(i). 
Proof of B8: since Ax~f(x) = s(x), B8 is equivalent to 
Ax((f(x) 4- s(x)) + f(x) = c(x)) A Ax((f(x) 4- s(x)) + s(x) = c(x»; 
(i) assume ye(f(x) 4- s(x)) 4- f(x), hence f(x) 4- s(x) is connected with f(x) 
A f(x) 4- s(x) and f(x) have no common element V f(x) 4- s(x) = f(x); but 
f(x) 4- s(x) and f(x) have a common element A ~if(x) 4- s(x) = f(x); 
consequently n Vy(ye(f(x) + s(x)) + f(x)), hence (f(x) + s(x)) + f(x) = Xy(y 
4= y), hence (f(x) + m(x)) + f(x) = c(x); 
(ii) assume ye(f(x) + s(x)) + s(x); continue mutatis mutandis as in (i). 
The model given for T O is trivial only with respect to B5. But let the 
second-order ODs of T refer to the spheres in an infinite space (which 
have positive radius), including the sphere in the space 'whose centre is 
everywhere and whose surface nowhere', that is, the sphere in the space 
which has infinite radius, that is, the space itself (called 'the super-
sphere'). The spheres are certain sets of points in the space, and the 
first-order ODs of T refer to points in the space. We define: 
For all second-order ODs 0 of T ' : 
(a') m(0) : = Xy (y is in the surface of 0) 
(y is in the surface of 0 = yeO A Vr (r is a maximal distance 
between points of 0 A Vy' (y'eO A distance (y,y') = r))) 
(b') s(0): = Xy (y is a centre of 0) 
(y is a centre of 0 = yeO A Ar (r is a maximal distance 
between points of 0 3 Ay'Ay" (y'eO A y"e0 A distance 
(y',y") = r 3 d. (y',y) = r/2 A d. (y",y) = r/2))) 
(c') f(0) : = Xy (Vy*Vy" (y' is a centre of 0 A y" is in the surface of 0 A y 
is between y' and y") V i Vy" (y" is in the surface of 0) A y 
is a centre of 0) 
The rest is the same as in the previous definition. (Notice that the 
interpretations of m(0) and s(0) have interchanged.) Any sphere in the 
space is either a normal (finite) sphere or the super-sphere. For normal 
spheres x in the space we have: ~im(x) = c(x), s(x) = Xy (y = the centre of 
x), Xy (y = the centre of x) 4= x, f(x) = Xy Vy" (y" is in the surface of x A y 
is between the centre of x and y"), ~is(x) = f(x), ~ix = f(x). For the 
super-sphere in the space g on the other hand, we have: m(g) = c(g), 
s(g) = g (since there is no maximal distance r between points of g), 
f(g) ~ s(g)> g = is now valid in a non-trivial manner. With respect 
to g B l is proved as follows: g = s(g), hence g = (s(g) + c(g)) + s(g) by A2 
(which is independent of the universe of discourse of T ) , hence 
g = (f(g) + m(g)) + s(g) = s(g), (f(g) = s(g), m(g) = c(g)). With respect to 
normal spheres, it is proved as previously in the model of circles. 
XII. As has already been mentioned, there exists a sequel to this paper. 
In it extensions of language and axiom-system are introduced, always in 
close correspondence to Aquinatic teachings; these extensions serve to 
strengthen the implicit definition of Aquinatic terms which is provided 
by the original axiom-system. The first extension consists in adding the 
predicates L(0) ('0 is a living object') and H(0) ('0 is a human object'); 
this allows to formulate new definitions, for example A(0): = 
Vv(L(v) A M(v) A 0 = a(v)), where 0 can be replaced by any E D ( T o be 
a soul is to be the actuating form of a living material object'), and new 
axioms, for example Ax(H(x) z> Vx'(I(x') A x ' = a(x))) (The actuating 
form of a human being is a created immaterial substance'). The second 
extension consists in adding individuation-axioms, for example 
AxAx'(s(x) = s(x') Z> x = x') ('esse diversum est in diversis'). Finally the 
intuitive interpretation of Aquinatic terms is discussed in detail (what -
formal developments aside - is to be intuitively understood by the pure 
form, the essence, the matter etc. of an object?), and it is found that to a 
surprising extent they can be intuitively elucidated; the distinction 
between universal and individual forms is seen to be very helpful for 
this. The sequel ends with a synopsis of Aquinas' theory of forms, and 
reaches the conclusion that Aquinas is not a pure Aristotelian, but -
concerning God - a genuine Platonist. 
Since the sequel comprises in manuscript another 32 pages, it could 
not be published in this journal. I will be happy to make the material 
available to anyone interested. 
